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Context within Society - Privacy 
 
Right to Privacy 
 
• Privacy is a human right;  
 
• Privacy of correspondence (communications) is outlined by: 
 
– Article 12 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948); 
 
– Article 8 of European Convention of Human Rights (1953); 
 
– Human Rights Act (1998) within United Kingdom law. 
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Challenges to Privacy 
 
• A right to privacy of communications except: ͞ 
 
…in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being 
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of 
health or ŵorals, or for the protectioŶ of the rights aŶd freedoŵs of others.͟  
 
• Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000 
– Requires a court order based on sufficient evidence and/or 
intelligence for law enforcement and/or security agencies 
of the UK Government to undertake surveillance of a 
named iŶdiǀidual s͛ ŵoďile phoŶe ƌeĐoƌds, e-mails, Internet 
activity etc.  RIPA currently under review. 
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Challenges to Privacy (Update) 
 
• Communications Data Bill 2012 
 
Proposed that a court warrant, evidence and/or intelligence are 
no longer required by law enforcement and security agencies of 
the UK Government, who undertake real-time surveillance of all 
ĐitizeŶ͛s ŵoďile phoŶe ƌeĐoƌds, e-mails, Internet activity etc.; 
regardless of any suspicion or otherwise. 
 
The balance between a providing a right to privacy of 
communications and at the same time maintaining national 
security and prevention of crime, is a long running debate, not 
just in the United Kingdom but across the world. 
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Challenges to Privacy (Latest Updates) 
 
• Communications Data Bill – not iŶĐluded duƌiŶg QueeŶ s͛ 
speech (May 2013); 
 
• Pƌoposed ͚ƌeǀieǁ͛ ;possiďlǇ eǀeŶ ƌepealͿ of the Human Rights 
Act 1998, possibly replaced by a UK ͚Bill of ‘ights͛; 
 
 
͚Bill of ‘ights͛ - will the right to privacy of communications be 
included, and if so, to what extent? 
 
A ĐoŶtiŶuallǇ ĐhaŶgiŶg positioŶ…! 
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Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) 
 
Privacy Enhancing Technologies 
 
• Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) covers a wide range of 
tools aŶd teĐhŶiƋues ǁith the aiŵ to pƌoteĐt aŶ iŶdiǀidual s͛ 
privacy within technological environments, including: 
 
– Cryptography – e.g. disk encryption, encrypted network traffic; 
– Steganography – e.g. hidiŶg ͚seŶsitiǀe͛ doĐuŵeŶts ǁithiŶ photogƌaphs; 
– Obfuscation – e.g. morphing Peer-to-Peer (P2P) traffic into Voice over 
IP (VOIP) to by-pass blocking, improve network priority; 
– Pseudo-identity – Proxy services, Virtual Private Network (VPN), and 
Anonymous Communication Systems (Anonymity Networks); 
– Anti-forensics, counter-surveillance; 
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Anonymity Networks 
 
• AŶoŶǇŵitǇ Ŷetǁoƌks, suĐh as ͚The OŶioŶ ‘outer͛ (officially 
known as Tor not TOR), aim to provide a degree of anonymity 
for an individual's Internet traffic; 
 
• Tor uses a technique known as Onion Routing, which is based 
on the original theory of Mix-nets; 
 
• The Tor network is free to use, and can be accessed from a 
range of software (e.g. Tor Browser Bundle (TBB)) and is 
available on a number of platforms / operating systems. 
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Tor – How does it work? 
 
• The Tor network is a distributed overlay network which sits 
͚oŶ top͛ of the IŶteƌŶet itself, aŶd uses the staŶdaƌd IŶteƌŶet 
Protocol (IP) for network routing; 
 
• Acts as a multi-hop proxy between a Tor client and the 
destination e.g. website; combined with cryptography in 
order to provide anonymous web-surfing and privacy; 
 
• Toƌ uses TƌaŶsŵissioŶ CoŶtƌol PƌotoĐol ;TCPͿ as it s͛ tƌaŶspoƌt 
protocol, however as an overlay network, Tor additionally 
requires application level congestion control to try and ensure 
steady traffic flow within the anonymity network itself.  
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The Internet (simple version!) 
12 
The Tor Network (another simple version!) 
Key statistics as at 13/05/2013: 
 
3500 routers worldwide relaying Internet traffic; 
1700 bridges to the Tor network to circumvent the blocking of accessing the Tor network; 
Average of 500,000 – 600,000 daily users; 
 
Source: https://metrics.torproject.org/ 
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KeǇ ͚PƌiǀaĐǇ-EŶhaŶĐiŶg͛ Featuƌes of Toƌ 
 
• The 3-hop approach ensures that no Tor router has a 
complete view of the circuit;  as each layer is only revealed 
oŶe ͚hop͛ at a tiŵe, ǁhiĐh ĐoŶtaiŶs the IP addƌess of the Ŷeǆt 
destination and remaining layer; 
 
• Cryptography, in terms of both circuit ĐƌeatioŶ ;͚telesĐopiŶg͛Ϳ 
and also applied to each layer of the message using Transport 
Layer Security (TLS) e.g. as with HTTPS for on-line banking 
etc.; 
 
• The session keys used for the cryptography are ephemeral 
(short-lived), ǁhiĐh ƌeduĐes the ƌisk of a ͚ƌeplaǇ͛ attaĐk. 
 
 
14 
Research Problem 
 
Anonymity with Mobility 
 
• Estimates are that Internet connections from mobile devices 
are eǆpeĐted to eǆĐeed ĐoŶŶeĐtioŶs froŵ ͚statiĐ͛ ďǇ ϮϬϭ4: 
– Latest estimates towards the end-2013; 
– Some places have already achieved this e.g. South Korea. 
 
• SiŶĐe ϮϬϭϬ, Tor availaďle oŶ ͚sŵart͛ phoŶe teĐhŶologǇ as 
Orbot for Android: 
– Initially a joint development project from Google and University of 
Cambridge but now maintained by The Guardian Project; 
– Limited research so far has been undertaken to assess the 
performance for mobile Tor clients and the two studies have not 
looked at the iŵpliĐatioŶs of ͚ƌoaŵiŶg͛ ďetǁeeŶ Ŷetǁoƌks. 
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Key issues 
 
• Onion Routing (1996) and Tor (2004)  were designed at a time 
when only static devices accessed the Internet.  The current 
design requires the client to have a persistent Internet 
connection (incl. external IP address), to maintain circuit 
integrity; 
• Tor currently takes an average of over 7 seconds to rebuild 
circuits for a new Internet connection; 
• ͚Roaming͛ ďetǁeeŶ Ŷetǁoƌks ;oƌ eǀeŶ ǁithiŶ saŵe seƌǀiĐe 
e.g. BT Wifi™Ϳ ŵaǇ ĐhaŶge a Toƌ ŵoďile ĐlieŶt s͛ eǆteƌŶal IP 
address every couple of minutes while walking – or even more 
if ͚ĐoŵŵutiŶg .͛ 
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Key issues (2) 
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Case Study 
 
 
My daily walk to work: 
 
Start @ A: 
 
- Hutchinson 3 Wi-Fi 
 
En-route: 
 
- 6 x BT Wi-Fi hand-offs; 
 
- ͚BlaĐk spot͛ @ JesŵoŶd DeŶe ‘oad ƌeǀeƌt to 
EE cellular (Expensive!); 
 
- 7 x BT Wi-Fi hand-offs; 
 
Finish @ B: 
 
-Northumbria University Wi-Fi (Free!) 
 
Total: 4 different services, 15 hand-offs. 
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Early modelling 
 
Aim:  
• Assess the potential impact to both the mobile client and 
overall Tor network, using Tor while roaming; 
 
Approach: 
• Undertake initial modelling through network simulation tools 
(OMNET++), Matlab, and laboratory experiments; 
• Simulate a mobile Tor client roaming between networks at 
different speeds (m/s) and introduced circuit rebuild timings 
(s); with differing web browsing loads. 
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Early modelling results 
 
 
 
Key points: 
1. At higher speeds (commute - bus, highway – car), the use of Tor is not feasible; 
2. Even at average walking pace of 1.2 m/s, a significant (66% – 77%) drop in performance; indicative markers at A (3), B (7), C (15 
to 20) seconds, as timings for `good', `average' and `slow' circuit build times respectively 
3. An average of 3 - 4% ͚oƌphaŶed͛ data oďseƌǀed left ďǇ the ŵoďile Toƌ ĐlieŶt afteƌ haŶd-off; which causes additional congestion 
       within the wider Tor network; due to two-tier traffic management. 
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Contribution 
 
Possible solutions 
 
• ͚Architectural͛ changes to how Onion Routing and Tor works, 
with the aim to provide a persistent connection to the Tor 
network even when a mobile Internet connection is broken.  
University of Wollongong examined and rejected the use of MobileIP; 
 
• ͚Lighter͛ transport protocols to replace TCP, such as UDP-
ďased ͚fiƌe-and-foƌget .͛   The University of Cambridge are currently 
testing Tor with µTP; 
 
• ͚Throttling͛ ŵoďile Toƌ ĐlieŶts, to assess risk of and/or predict 
hand-off; and adapt the amount of traffic entering the Tor 
network accordingly to reduce potential congestion. University 
of Waterloo researchiŶg ͚throttliŶg͛ for Tor clieŶts usiŶg Peer-to-Peer. 
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Current work 
 
April - June 2013: 
 
Analysis (modelling) of different application-level throttling 
algorithms, based on previous work by University of Waterloo to 
throttle Bit-torrent users on Tor; and evaluate effectiveness for 
mobile scenarios; 
 
Aiŵ to ͚optiŵise͛ the ďalaŶĐe ďetǁeeŶ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe foƌ the 
mobile client and impact on the Tor network; 
 
Results and findings expected end-June. 
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Current and future challenges / drivers 
 
• The current lack of suitable simulation tools, in terms of 
accurately simulating both mobility and Tor together; 
 
• The impact on this research if Tor adopts new lighter 
transport protocol e.g. µTP – less congestion?; 
 
• Development (sponsored - $1m) of Tor-supported Voice-over-
IP (VoIP) tool - more mobile (and persistent) Tor usage?; 
 
• Increased migration to HTML5 support (e.g. Youtube); to 
ƌeduĐe the ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt of `uŶsafe͛ Flash plaǇeƌ – more 
streaming, live and/or recorded traffic over Tor? 
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Warning 
 
The use of Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PETs) is illegal in 
some countries. 
 
For example, in one country, the tariff for attempting to 
circumvent government censorship and/or restrictions, using Tor 
etc., is 15 years imprisonment. 
 
Please ensure that you are aware of your local laws before 
attempting to use any PETs. 
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Thank you. 
 
Any Questions? 
